The trade deal between India and the European Union is as much about geopolitics as it’s about intercontinental business relations.

The EU is already India’s largest partner with trade in goods reaching $142.3bn (£104.07bn) in 2024, amounting to 11.5% of the South Asian nation’s total trade. India is the EU’s ninth largest trading partner.

These are impressive numbers and reflect strong relations. And yet, trade talks were stuck for two decades.

That raises the question: what’s changed now? The answer lies in the fast-evolving geopolitical landscape and the unpredictability of the US administration under President Donald Trump.

The US leader has used tariffs as a bargaining chip in some negotiations but he has often used them to punish countries, including partners, which don’t agree with his worldview.

The US has imposed 50% tariffs on Indian goods, which include a 25% penalty for Delhi’s refusal to stop buying oil from Russia.

Some EU countries recently faced fresh tariff threats from Trump as the US president was put out by their refusal to accept his proposed takeover of Greenland. He later withdrew the threat, but experts say it did rattle the EU.

The EU and India are not alone in looking to hedge their bets when it comes to the US – the free trade agreement (FTA) in Delhi was secured amid a flurry of countries striking deals and patching things up as they try to cope with global unpredictability.

The EU-India pact – the seventh trade deal India has completed recently – comes after Brussels signed a trade accord with South American trade bloc Mercosur earlier this month after 25 years of negotiation. Experts say the Trump factor helped speed that up too, though it’s now facing legal challenges in Europe.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney – who warned of a “rupture” in the post-war international order last week – is just back from a visit resetting ties in China which will boost trade ties, drawing Trump’s ire and fresh threats of 100% tariffs. Carney is also due to travel to India in the near future, with trade high on the agenda. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer is heading to Beijing this week, accompanied by dozens of British business executives, following years of strained ties with China.

Against this backdrop, the India-EU trade deal, which is still subject to ratification, assumes greater geopolitical significance as it achieves more than just trade results – for both Brussels and Delhi.

It sends a message to Trump that global powers have started to look at ways to club together to protect themselves against his administration.

“One could argue that the Trump factor provided a very strong impetus to the deal because both India and the EU are facing shock US tariffs that they never expected,” said Michael Kugelman, senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council.

He added that Trump is a big reason why the EU and India have been able to overcome most of their differences and put issues they couldn’t resolve on the back-burner for future negotiations.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen both called Tuesday’s agreement “the mother of all deals”.

“This is the tale of two giants – the world’s second and fourth largest economies – two giants who choose partnership in a true win-win fashion, a strong message that co-operation is the best answer to global challenges,” said von der Leyen, standing beside Modi after they exchanged agreements.

“By combining these strengths, we reduce strategic dependencies at a time when trade is increasingly weaponised… We are not only making our economies stronger – we are also delivering security for our people in an increasingly insecure world.”

Modi said the global order is in “great turmoil” and the trade deal would strengthen supply chains globally.

“This means it is not just a trade agreement. This is a new blueprint for shared prosperity,” he said.

The two leaders’ may or may not have intended the deal to annoy the Trump administration, but they appear to have done exactly that.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told ABC News on Sunday that the EU was “financing the war against themselves” by signing a trade deal with Delhi.

He was referring to India’s purchase of Russian crude, which US officials have often said was indirectly financing Moscow’s war in Ukraine. India has always denied this, saying the purchase of Russian oil secures energy needs of millions of its people.

The time-tested Delhi-Moscow relations are also the reason why India has been reluctant to abruptly cut business ties with Russia. It has long relied on Moscow for military hardware but today’s deal will help it build on already strong defence ties with France as it looks to diversify its defence imports portfolio with other European nations too.

The India deal also gives the EU access to another huge market and may help it reduce its reliance on China in the future.

“India will also look at this partnership as a way to counter China’s dominance in global trade, which it envisaged doing with the US. But it’s a different state of play right now. The EU likewise sees India as a useful country to partner within its own efforts to counter China,” Kugelman added.

But it’s worth remembering that behind the chest-thumping headlines, there is still plenty of work to do for both India and the EU. While negotiations around the deal have concluded, the formal signing of the agreement will take a long time..

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L’article Trump’s shadow looms over India-EU trade deal est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Leading presidents and prime ministers from around the world are meeting for the annual G20 leaders’ summit in India’s capital, Delhi, from 9-10 September.

Narendra Modi is an authoritarian figure who, as India’s prime minister since 2014, has pushed his country into increasingly becoming a “de facto ethnic democracy”, in which Hindus define the national identity and non-Hindus are seen as second-class citizens. Yet as the host of the upcoming talks of the world’s 20 largest economies, Mr Modi will be feted by major global leaders – except his absent fellow strongmen Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Mr Modi’s dangerous majoritarianism is too easily overlooked by the west, as the G20 glad-handing will show. India had been considered an exemplary liberal parliamentary democracy among developing countries. This is being slowly dismantled by Mr Modi’s brand of Hindu nationalism. State intimidation has seen civil society harassed and critics jailed. A report by a group of prominent lawyers last year warned that “the administration of law has become the means by which … the Muslim community can be kept in a state of perpetual fear”. Since May, the north-eastern Indian state of Manipur has been burning, with its valley Hindus and highland Christians sinking into bloody fighting. Mr Modi’s party blames non-Hindus for the violence.

The Indian prime minister shares the ideological viewpoint of Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen in France and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Mr Modi claims India suffered 1,000 years of servitude: 750 years of Muslim rule, plus 250 years of British rule. Pulling down, or discarding, symbols of that history – mosques, mausoleums, Lutyens’ Delhi buildings – is excused, in this thinking, because this represents a national, Hindu resurgence. Mr Modi tellingly speaks of 1,000 years of rule to come.

The west thinks that it must keep stumm because it needs India to contain China. But at what cost to democracy and human rights? Mukul Kesavan, an Indian historian, wrote earlier this year that when the White House rolled out the red carpet for Mr Modi, “One of the more entertaining things about [his] visit has been the sight of [Joe] Biden welcoming a foreign leader who had openly campaigned for his predecessor and liberal bête noire, Donald Trump.”

Last year, Gothenburg University’s annual report on the state of global democracy warned of a wave of “autocratization” spreading around the world. Since 2020, the report said, India has not been a working democracy but an “electoral autocracy” similar to that in Russia. All is not lost. India’s next general election will provide a chance for the public to have its say – though how much remains to be seen, given that a peer-reviewed paper suggested that in 2019 Mr Modi won around 11 seats by suppressing the Muslim vote. Its author, a respected economist, quit after his university failed to back him. The arrival of the opposition Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance, otherwise known as INDIA, has also unsettled Mr Modi. Perhaps peeved at being opposed by “INDIA”, Mr Modi wants to respond only to the country’s Sanskrit name “Bharat”.

India’s prime minister says the G20 should let the global south shape the world’s future. As Human Rights Watch pointed out this week, “many proposed summit topics – debt crises, social protection programs, food security, climate change, internet freedom – are at their root about human rights”. Britain has its own share of democratic backsliding. But if Mr Modi desires successful outcomes then he, like all autocratic leaders, should understand why his actions at home undermine the arguments he wants to promote abroad.

Western democracies are wrong to overlook a country’s descent into electoral autocracy because they believe they need it to contain China

What is the G20?

The G20 – or Group of Twenty – is a club of countries which meets to discuss plans for the global economy.

Between them, G20 countries account for 85% of the world’s economic output and 75% of world trade. They contain two-thirds of the global population.

The members are the European Union and 19 nations – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US. Spain is always invited as a guest.

A smaller group of G20 member countries meets as the G7.

Some of the G20 member nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – have formed a separate group called Brics.

This is due to expand, having invited six other nations to join at its recent summit: Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

What does the group discuss?

The issues discussed by G20 leaders have broadened in recent years from just economics to include issues such as climate change, sustainable energy, international-debt forgiveness and taxing multinational corporations.

Every year, a different G20 member state takes over the presidency and sets the agenda for meetings.

Indonesia held the presidency in 2022, and the leaders’ summit was held in Bali.

As 2023 president, India wants the Delhi event to concentrate on sustainable development, as well as measures to spread economic growth more evenly between developed and developing countries.

The summit also provides an opportunity for one-to-one discussions to take place alongside group sessions.

The White House says that US President Joe Biden will talk to individual leaders about tackling climate change, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and getting global organisations such as the World Bank to do more to fight poverty.

However, the Kremlin says Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will not be attending the summit, and it’s been widely reported that China’s President Xi Jinping will also stay away.

Are there any controversial issues for G20 countries?

Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely to cause discord at the Delhi summit.

In March 2022, the G20 foreign ministers were unable to reach agreements at their meeting because of fierce arguments over the war between the US and Russia delegations.

At the Bali leaders’ summit in November 2022, discussions were dominated by a crisis involving missiles from the war falling on Poland’s side of the border with Ukraine.

In May, China and Saudi Arabia boycotted a G20 meeting on tourism which was held in Indian-administered Kashmir because the Kashmir region contains territory claimed by Pakistan as well as India.

A row has also broken out between India and China over a long-running border dispute, after Beijing released a map which claims the state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin plateau as Chinese territory.

What does the summit mean for India?

India has been positioning itself as a leading voice of developing countries known as the Global South in recent years and G20 is seen as its chance to deliver on these promises on a bigger stage.

The summit also comes ahead of the 2024 general elections in India and could bolster Mr Modi’s image as a leader who commands respect on the global stage.

The government has held hundreds of meeting across some 50 cities in the run-up to the summit in Delhi.

For months, cities and towns have been dotted with shiny billboards featuring the G20 logo and Mr Modi’s photos, framing the event as the prime minister’s earnest attempt to bring the world to India.

Mr Modi also appears to share a personal rapport with many of his G20 counterparts, including President Biden who accorded him a coveted state visit in June.

That said, the summit is not expected to be a breeze for India, given the current complex geopolitical situation.

Many economies are still struggling to recover from the pandemic and have grown increasingly anxious about the war and its economic impact, with global surges in food and energy prices.

Why is there a ‘family photo’?

At the end of key summits, the heads of government often pose for a group photograph, known as the “family photo”.

However, the diplomatic discord revealed by the image sometimes makes headlines in its own right.

In 2018, following the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was largely ignored, and made to stand at the far end of the group.

What has the G20 achieved?

At the 2008 and 2009 leaders’ summits, during the financial crisis, leaders agreed a host of measures to rescue the global economic system.

But some critics argue that subsequent summits have been less successful, often as a result of tensions between rival world powers.

However, bilateral meetings at the summit have often proved constructive.

In 2019, at Osaka, then-US president Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to resume talks to settle a major trade dispute.

Do G20 summits attract protests?

Big demonstrations often take place around the leaders’ summits.

Anti-capitalist protesters demonstrated at the 2010 summit in Toronto and the 2017 summit in Hamburg.

Thousands of demonstrators marched during the 2018 summit in Rio de Janeiro to protest against the G20’s economic policies.

In 2009 Ian Tomlinson, a newspaper seller, died after he was caught up in protests during the G20 summit in London.

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L’article View on India’s G20 summit: a backsliding democracy gets to play host est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

India has launched its first observation mission to the Sun, just days after the country made history by becoming the first to land near the Moon’s south pole.

Aditya-L1 lifted off from the launch pad at Sriharikota on Saturday at 11:50 India time (06:20 GMT).

It will travel 1.5 million km (932,000 miles) from the Earth – 1% of the Earth-Sun distance.

India’s space agency says it will take four months to travel that far.

Congratulations all the #ISRO & entire Team 😊👏

Aditya L1 successfully launch! 🚀😍

1st Solar Mission of #INDIA 🇮🇳🌞🛰️#AdityaL1MissionLaunch #SolarMission #ISRO #isroindia #AdityaL1 #MissionAdityaL1 #INDvsPAK #AsiaCup2023 pic.twitter.com/1mzSs08xpl

— Vivek Shah (@VivekCenation30) September 2, 2023

India’s first space-based mission to study the solar system’s biggest object is named after Surya – the Hindu god of Sun who is also known as Aditya.

And L1 stands for Lagrange point 1 – the exact place between Sun and Earth where the Indian spacecraft is heading.

আজ ২রা সেপ্টেম্বর, ২০২৩ বেলা ১১টা ৫০ মিনিটে অন্ধ্রপ্রদেশের শ্রীহরিকোটা থেকে সফল উৎক্ষেপণ করা হলো 𝐀𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐚 𝐋𝟏(আদিত্য এল ১)-কে।🇮🇳🚀❤☀️#𝐈𝐒𝐑𝐎🛰 #𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐚𝐥𝟏𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 🚀#𝐀𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐚𝐋𝟏 #𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐲𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐦𝐚𝐬𝐤𝐚𝐫 #𝐈𝐒𝐑𝐎 #𝐢𝐬𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧🇮🇳 pic.twitter.com/TmyJ6EpSye

— Amar kowner (@AmarKowner) September 2, 2023

According to the European Space Agency, a Lagrange point is a spot where the gravitational forces of two large objects – such as the Sun and the Earth – cancel each other out, allowing a spacecraft to “hover”.

Once Aditya-L1 reaches this “parking spot”, it would be able to orbit the Sun at the same rate as the Earth. This also means the satellite will require very little fuel to operate.

Launches made by ISRO in 2023:
1. SSLV-D2/EOS-07 Mission.
2. LVM3-M3/OneWeb India-2 Mission.
3. PSLV-C55/TeLEOS-2 Mission.
4. GSLV-F12/NVS-01 Mission.
5. LVM3-M4/Chandrayaan-3 Mission.
6. PSLV-C56/DS-SAR Mission.
7. PSLV-C57/Aditya-L1 Mission.#ISRO #ISROMissions #ISRO_ADITYA_L1 pic.twitter.com/u5KJtWTP33

— Subhashis Das (Shann) (@das_shann) September 2, 2023

On Saturday morning, a few thousand people gathered in the viewing gallery set up by the Indian Space Research Agency (Isro) near the launch site to watch the blast off.

It was also broadcast live on national TV where commentators described it as a “magnificent” launch. Isro scientists said the launch had been successful and its “performance is normal”.

#AdityaL1 #ISRO pic.twitter.com/Kw170SUD7P

— CharanRaj (@thecharanraj) September 2, 2023

After an hour and four minutes of flight-time, Isro declared it “mission successful”.

“Now it will continue on its journey – it’s a very long journey of 135 days, let’s wish it [the] best of luck,” Isro chief Sreedhara Panicker Somanath said.

Project director Nigar Shaji said once Aditya-L1 reaches its destination, it will benefit not only India, but the global scientific community.

#AdityaL1Launch #AdityaL1#AdityaL1MissionLaunch #ISRO#AdityaL1 #MonzaGP #oafchttps://t.co/xVDteVt4hf

— NextPMRahul24 (@NextPMRaGA) September 2, 2023

Aditya-L1 will now travel several times around the Earth before being launched towards L1.

From this vantage position, it will be able to watch the Sun constantly – even when it is hidden during an eclipse – and carry out scientific studies.

Isro has not said how much the mission would cost, but reports in the Indian press put it at 3.78bn rupees ($46m; £36m).

Isro says the orbiter carries seven scientific instruments that will observe and study the solar corona (the outermost layer); the photosphere (the Sun’s surface or the part we see from the Earth) and the chromosphere (a thin layer of plasma that lies between the photosphere and the corona).

The studies will help scientists understand solar activity, such as solar wind and solar flares, and their effect on Earth and near-space weather in real time.

Former Isro scientist Mylswamy Annadurai says the Sun constantly influences the Earth’s weather through radiation, heat and flow of particles and magnetic fields. At the same time, he says, it also impacts the space weather.

“Space weather plays a role in how effectively the satellites function. Solar winds or storms can affect the electronics on satellites, even knock down power grids. But there are gaps in our knowledge of space weather,” Mr Annadurai told the BBC.

India has more than 50 satellites in space and they provide many crucial services to the country, including communication links, data on weather, and help predict pest infestations, droughts and impending disasters. According to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), approximately 10,290 satellites remain in the Earth’s orbit, with nearly 7,800 of them currently operational.

Aditya will help us better understand, and even give us a forewarning, about the star on which our lives depend, Mr Annadurai says.

“Knowing the activities of the Sun such as solar wind or a solar eruption a couple of days ahead will help us move our satellites out of harm’s way. This will help increase the longevity of our satellites in space.”

The mission, he adds, will above all help improve our scientific understanding of the Sun – the 4.5 billion-year-old star that holds our solar system together.

India’s solar mission comes just days after the country successfully landed the world’s first-ever probe near the lunar south pole.

With that, India also became only the fourth country in the world to achieve a soft landing on the Moon, after the US, the former Soviet Union and China.

If Aditya-L1 is successful, India will join the select group of countries that are already studying the Sun.

Japan was the first to launch a mission in 1981 to study solar flares and the US space agency Nasa and European Space Agency (ESA) have been watching the Sun since the 1990s.

In February 2020, Nasa and ESA jointly launched a Solar Orbiter that is studying the Sun from close quarters and gathering data that, scientists say, will help understand what drives its dynamic behaviour.

And in 2021, Nasa’s newest spacecraft Parker Solar Probe made history by becoming the first to fly through corona, the outer atmosphere of the Sun.

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L’article Aditya-L1: India successfully launches its first mission to the Sun.. Video est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Private hospitals in India and Kenya accused of refusing people on low incomes vital healthcare, or holding them hostage until bills have been paid, benefit from UK government investment funds, according to a report by Oxfam.

Investments worth hundreds of millions of pounds by government-backed agencies are used to facilitate the “impoverishment and even the imprisonment of the very people [the private hospitals] are supposed to be helping”, said the development charity.

A succession of incidents that in some cases have left patients with large debts shows the policy of investing in private healthcare is flawed and should be halted by the UK government, the charity said.

Oxfam’s Sick Development report is a critique of the millions of pounds taken from the UK aid budget and invested into foreign businesses and programmes in poor countries via British International Investment (BII), which is owned and managed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

The report found that the UK government was one of several, including those of France and Germany, and international groups like the World Bank that backed investments by wholly or part state-owned agencies into private healthcare groups, themselves often owned by large US private equity groups.

Development charity says patients denied treatment or held hostage until fees paid in private facilities in India and Kenya

Oxfam said investments by these agencies – known as development finance institutions (DFIs) – into private healthcare providers in low and middle-income countries should be redirected into strengthening public health systems “to help those living in poverty to access healthcare”. It said many of the countries receiving development money for healthcare had become “go-to destinations for health tourists”.

The report found “dozens of cases”, from a BII-funded hospital chain in Kenya, of patients being imprisoned until they paid medical fees.

This included a secondary school student who was held hostage in hospital for 11 months. “There have also been several cases of the hospital refusing to release dead bodies until fees are paid, in at least one case for over two years,” the report said.

In India, private hospitals funded by BII were accused of denying people treatment, “even though they had government health insurance cards entitling them to free care”.

Much of the report focuses on the activities of BII, which is the UK’s DFI. It has a mission to invest in private sector organisations in developing countries to boost growth and achieve the United Nations development goals.

The agency said all its activities are directed towards achieving these goals and supporting private healthcare businesses to “strengthen the quality and accessibility of healthcare in ways which improve the lives of millions”.

A spokesperson said: “Every healthcare system in the world – be they public or private – have isolated incidences of shortfalls in care.

“We take the Oxfam allegations extremely seriously. We investigate all such incidents whenever they come to light and have an established complaints mechanism for anyone to raise matters of concern.

“We continue to encourage Oxfam to share any evidence they hold of these alleged cases so that we can accelerate our investigations.”

The World Bank’s DFI, the International Finance Corporation, said it was always concerned by “improper healthcare delivery” in hospitals where it invested, but “private sector-led innovations such as digital health solutions can allow providers to help augment health systems’ capacity and capabilities and reach people who are vulnerable, poor or living in hard-to-reach rural areas”.

Oxfam said the evidence from its research in India, Kenya and Nigeria was that private hospitals failed to honour promises to accept accident and emergency cases and the profit-motive meant cases of financial or medical abuse were covered up.

The charity’s senior health policy adviser, Anna Marriott, who investigated many of the claims made against individual hospitals, said more than 90% of BII’s health investments were “out-of-sight and unaccountable, made via fee-charging and profit-hungry private equity funds mostly domiciled in tax havens”.

An inquiry by the all-party international development committee into the UK’s use of DFIs is due to be published next month.

“This is far more than just a case of a few bad apples. Wherever we looked we found cases of exclusion or exploitation and some appalling human rights violations,” said Marriott.

Oxfam’s local representatives spoke to people who were pushed into poverty by health fees of up to $36,000 (£29,000), the report said. “There were also cases of emergency patients, including a stab victim, not being treated until relatives turned up with cash.”

The report said BII-funded private hospitals were found charging “astronomical fees for maternity care”. In one hospital in Nigeria, the fee for an “uncomplicated birth” was the equivalent of 12 years’ wages for the poorest 10% of the population. A caesarean section cost the equivalent of 24 years’ wages, the report said.

Marriott said: “Every second, 60 more people are pushed into poverty by catastrophic health costs, and instead of helping to tackle the problem this way of spending UK aid is fuelling it.

“At a time of spiralling need and decimated aid budgets, it’s more crucial than ever that any development funding for health is spent as effectively as possible to reach those without access to healthcare.”

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With Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi slated for a June 22 State Visit to Washington, India will, if briefly, be front-page news in the United States. Since President Clinton ended a chill in U.S.-India relations almost 25 years ago, successive American and Indian administrations across political parties have worked to strengthen ties.

So it’s fair to ask: how robust is this relationship today? As with the blind men and the elephant, the answer varies. Is India a bad bet, or is it, as the White House senior Asia policy official said recently, “the most important bilateral relationship with the United States on the global stage”?

Despite careful nurturing by Washington over the years, many aspects of U.S. ties with India remain challenging. Bilateral trade has grown tenfold since 2000, to $191 billion in 2022, and India became the ninth-largest US trading partner in 2021. But longstanding economic gripes persist, meriting 13 pages in the 2023 Foreign Trade Barriers report from the U.S. Trade Representative.

Multilaterally, India’s role in the fast-consolidating “Quad” consultation (comprised of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan) has brought shared purpose to Washington and New Delhi, both of which harbor concerns about China. But New Delhi also champions alternative non-Western groupings like the BRICS, and it remains outside bodies central to U.S. diplomacy like the U.N. Security Council and the G7.

Today, U.S.-India cooperation spans defense, global health, sustainable development, climate, and technology, among other things. But deep differences remain, including concerns in Washington about India’s democratic backsliding under Modi, and India’s failure to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In other words, the U.S.-India relationship has been transformed over the past quarter-century, but that transformation has not delivered a partnership or alignment similar to the closest U.S. alliances.

This shouldn’t surprise anyone. India is not a U.S. ally, and has not wanted to become one. To see relations with rising power India as on a pathway that culminates in a relationship like that the United States enjoys with Japan or the United Kingdom creates expectations that will not be met. Indian leaders across parties and over decades have long prioritized foreign policy independence as a central feature of India’s approach to the world. That remains the case even with Modi’s openness to the United States.

For India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, protecting his country’s hard-fought independence was a guiding principle for foreign policy. Speaking in the Indian Parliament in March 1951, Nehru noted that “By aligning ourselves with any one Power, you surrender your opinion, give up the policy you would normally pursue because somebody else wants you to pursue another policy.” Twelve years later, evaluating his country’s nonalignment policy in the pages of Foreign Affairs, Nehru went on to observe that it had not “fared badly,” and that “essentially, ‘non-alignment’ is freedom of action which is a part of independence.”

American President Harry S. Truman shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the tarmac as Nehru’s sister, diplomat Vijaya Pandit, and daughter, future Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, stand with them, in Washington D.C., on October 11, 1949.

PhotoQuest/Getty Images)

For famously allied Washington, nonalignment in the 20th century was a bridge too far; in 1956 then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proclaimed that neutrality was “an obsolete conception…immoral and shortsighted.” It did not help matters that the United States had entered an alliance with India’s arch-rival Pakistan in 1954, and sided with the Pakistani military in the bloody civil war that gave birth to Bangladesh in 1971. Nor, too, when Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a “Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation” with the USSR in 1971, definitively tilting India toward the Soviet Union even as the United States had tilted toward Pakistan.

Especially since the end of the Cold War, Indian leaders have sought to improve ties with Washington, but not by curtailing India’s independent approach to foreign policy. Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee proclaimed India and the United States “natural allies” in a landmark 1998 speech in New York. Yet this was perhaps more a term of art than a call for an alliance as it occurred against the backdrop of India’s nuclear tests, underscoring New Delhi’s willingness to upset global nuclear nonproliferation conventions, which it never joined. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whose 10 years at the helm greatly improved Indo-U.S. relations, pursued a civil-nuclear agreement with Washington and ushered in new cooperation in high technology, defense, and clean energy. But his government too defended its principle of “strategic autonomy” as a redline for its foreign policy even as it moved closer to Washington than ever in the past. Defending the civil-nuclear deal with Washington before Parliament in 2008, Singh twice asserted that “Our strategic autonomy will never be compromised.”

In important ways, Prime Minister Modi represents a break with India’s past, most notably in his emphasis on India’s Hindu, rather than syncretic and secular, cultural heritage. But his approach to the United States remains consistent with the history of his country’s foreign policy independence.

Modi has deepened ties with the United States, now across three U.S. presidents, through increased partnership in defense, in advanced technology, and in energy, just to name a few, as well as through moments of high symbolism, like his 2015 Republic Day invitation to former President Barack Obama, the first time an American president joined this day honoring India’s constitution. Even so, Modi has leaned into the United States while leaning into many other partners around the world. The Modi government invokes a Sanskrit saying, the “world is one family” (vasudhaiva kutumbakam), to frame Indian diplomacy. This approach has been termed “multialignment,” a theory of seeking positive ties as far and as widely as possible, without seeing contradictions in this approach.

In practice, New Delhi has carefully managed its relationships with Saudi Arabia as well as Iran; with Israel as well as the Palestinian Territories; with the United States as well as Russia. India’s G20 presidency this year encapsulates this orientation, with its Sanskritic theme of “One Earth, One Family, One Future,” and its twin efforts to lead the forum for the world’s 20 largest economies while self-consciously presenting itself as the “Voice of the Global South.”

With this history in mind, it’s easier to perceive that momentum in the U.S.-India relationship does not necessarily imply a path to a formal alliance or mutual defense treaty. In the United States, the mental model for positive international cooperation defaults to seeing “ally” as the ultimate endpoint. For India, that suggests a curtailment of independence. And with India, even as cooperation becomes more extensive than ever in the past, consequential differences remain.

For many in Washington, the dramatic growth of coordination and joint activities under the Quad consultative group fills a growing need in light of China’s rise, encompassing subjects as far-flung as maritime security, infrastructure, climate and resilience, vaccines, technology standards, and higher education—all underlining Indian strategic convergence with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Yet strategic convergence there does not mean everywhere: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its year-long war has elicited a tepid tut-tut from New Delhi, while India has escalated its purchases of cheap Russian oil at a time Washington seeks to isolate Moscow.

On closer examination this foreign policy independence and desire to define its own path so prized by India may offer lessons for U.S. foreign policy. The unipolar moment has passed; in its place we have more actors with their own perspectives, and a rising China with global ambitions and its own priorities increasingly shaping the priorities of others. The array of special relationships and alliances nurtured by the United States over decades are still in place, but many of these are now inflected by divergences with Washington. Take Turkey, or France, or Egypt, Pakistan, or Brazil. These U.S. allies do not always see their alliance relationship with Washington as barriers to taking decisions that contradict U.S. preferences. Indeed, President Emmanuel Macron too invokes “strategic autonomy.”

It’s here that India’s ambivalence offers a lens onto the world Washington is likely to encounter on a growing scale. In this world of more diffused power—a world with more diverse actors taking more distinctive foreign policy steps—partnerships and even alliances marked by substantial disagreements might be the new normal. In fact, managing ambivalence may be the central skill for American foreign policy in the years ahead.

World Opinions – Time.com

L’article Analysis. India Is Not a U.S. Ally—and Has Never Wanted to Be est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

During the holy month, legions of cooks gather at restaurants, warehouses, and street stalls to spend hours mashing the savory porridge of mutton, wheat, and spices, a beloved fixture of night markets and family iftar feasts.

ForFor much of the year, dawn breaks over sleepy lanes in Hyderabad, India, as chai and newspaper vendors rush to deliver piping hot tea alongside the news. But during Ramadan, mornings in the Old City, Secunderabad, Mallepally, Tolichowki, and other neighborhoods bring a different kind of activity. Dozens of eateries and warehouses fill with workers starting the long process of making massive amounts of haleem, an iconic savory porridge-like dish enjoyed across the Muslim world but especially beloved in Hyderabad during Ramadan, when it becomes a staple of the nightly iftar meal.

Across its many locations, the legendary Pista House, a name nearly synonymous with haleem, prepares around two tons of the dish every day during the holy month. The operation at the restaurant, and at many others, is a communal effort. Legions of cooks (including many temp workers hired just for the month) set up firewood, chop mutton, grind wheat, prep lentils, clean herbs and chiles, strain rose petals, crush cardamom, chop cinnamon bark, and ready other spices and ingredients before piling everything into bhattis, mud or brick kilns fitted with huge cauldrons. Then it’s all hands on deck, as crews of Muslims as well as non-Muslims work like well-oiled machines, using wooden mallets to rhythmically pound the mixture as it cooks for up to 12 hours. (If you thought tricep dips were hard, try pounding tons of meat into a paste, every day for a month, while fasting.)

As the sun sets, the streets transform again with a new flurry of activity. The usually traffic-packed road around the iconic Charminar monument and mosque is blocked off to allow pedestrians to explore freely. Almost simultaneously, thousands of stalls spring up, selling all things festive: shimmery bangles, little jars of attar (perfume), colorful sarees, embroidered anarkalis. Here and across the city, restaurants shift their attention to serving the food they spent all day preparing. Workers distribute Styrofoam bowls filled with haleem, topped with caramelized onions, coriander, shorba (meat consomme), slices of lemon, and other fixings.

Mohammed Sibghatullah Khan of Deccan Archive, a digital publication preserving Hyderabad’s heritage, recalls relatives across Hyderabad coming together during his childhood to prepare the feast that follows the fast. “Back then, this was the only time I got to eat haleem,” he says. The more family members who showed up to help, the more the work could be shared, with everyone taking turns to lend a hand in preparing the dish (at home, many families cook the elements of haleem separately before combining and mashing them to make the work a bit easier). Today, his family heads to Shah Ghouse, a popular choice, to fetch “buckets of haleem,” he says. “Cooking this dish has become a rare sight” in his house, Khan adds with a chuckle.

After he offers his prayers, Khan breaks the fast with his community over dates, fresh and dried fruits, and a handful of pakoras, before everyone disperses to hit the stalls, alongside diners of all backgrounds eating, shopping, and searching for the best bowl of haleem.

How did haleem come to Hyderabad?

The dish can be traced back to Arabian cookbooks from the 10th century. A predecessor called harees (also spelled jareesh) also consists of mashed meat and wheat; it came to India with Arab mercenaries, likely from Yemen, during Muslim rule in Hyderabad under the Nizams. These soldiers enjoyed harees for breakfast, when its high calories were especially useful. The barracks that housed these mercenaries eventually gave their name to the Barkas neighborhood, today home to hundreds of thousands of Arab descendants. You’ll still find harees year-round in Barkas, like at the long-standing Madina Hotel and Hadrami Harees, two restaurants that inspire long lines of customers as early as 5 a.m. and often scrape the bottom of their pots for the last harees by 10 a.m. (A sweeter version of harees is also on the menu at some eateries, though it’s not as popular.)

Unlike mild harees, which usually calls for equal parts wheat and meat, haleem calls for double the meat. Over time, locals augmented the ratio and added more seasoning. Though Hyderabad is equally famous and protective of its biryani, during Ramadan, the rice dish is quite literally on the back burner — which alone speaks volumes about the passion for haleem.

Versions of haleem and related dishes are hugely popular in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, West Asian countries, and Turkey. Across India, haleem can be found in Iranian restaurants in Mumbai; eateries in Bangalore’s Fraser Town, Old Delhi, Lucknow, Chennai, Ludhiana, and Goa; in traces in relative dishes like aleesa in Kerala, harissa in Kashmir, and khichra in Gujarat; and at many family gatherings and weddings.

Over the last decade especially, meat consumption, especially beef, has been a flash point for violence by right-wing Hindus on Muslim communities (as well as on Indigenous Adivasis and Dalits) as nationalists have pressed for the widespread adoption of vegetarianism. Given the context, the scene in Hyderabad during Ramadan, with crowds of Muslims, Hindus, and other non-Muslims all enjoying haleem, is striking.

What makes Hyderabadi haleem so popular?

At its best, haleem is an amalgamation of sensations and flavors — gamey mutton, subtly aromatic rose petals, punchy spices, slick ghee, generous fixings — all delivered in a caloric, easily digestible bowl. Anas Murtuza, the food critic behind BeingHydFoodie, claims he could fast for days after one bowl of haleem — though that doesn’t stop him from constantly visiting his go-to shop, City Diamond, a favorite of residents in Mehdipatnam..

World Opinions – Eater.com

L’article During Ramadan in Hyderabad, All Roads Lead to Haleem est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Indians took the tea the British were marketing to them, added spices, milk and sugar, and transformed it forever.

I remember jumping up to sit on the kitchen counter one afternoon. My five-year-old self wants to watch my mother making chai. She pushes me away from the gas stove but I am indignant and refuse to hop down, although I do move away a bit.

The water bubbles. She adds sugar, then takes a flat steel grater, balances it on the edge of the pot and grates in adrak (ginger).

“Why do we add this?” I ask, watching the shreds fall into the bubbling water.

“Child, I have to hurry I don’t have time for your questions,” she says. I sulk but I know that, being a doctor, she has to get to the hospital on time. I will ask grandma, I tell myself.

The ginger threads dance in the water. Then she adds the tea leaves, turning the contents of the pot brown. Stirring, she adds milk and lets it simmer over a low flame, still stirring. After a few minutes, she removes it from the heat and covers it. I hop down to watch the next step. She strains it in cups, puts them on a tray, and carries it to the dining table.

I run out. I have no interest in tasting it but am proud, boasting to my friends: “I know how to make chai.” By the end of the day, I have memorised the process forever.

I don’t want to ask to taste it because I know if I do, she will dilute it with more milk. “Children should not drink tea,” she would say. I hated that pale milky liquid.

The first time I tasted real chai, I was in grade three. I had scored good marks on a maths test and ran home that August afternoon to share the news with my mother and grandparents as they were having their chai. Basking in the appreciation and pats on my back, I asked if I could have chai. Mother refused, but grandfather smiled and poured some into a cup. I took it and breathed the aroma in deeply. I took one sip, then the second. The creamy, rich beverage warmed my heart and spirit and at that precise moment, I became a chai lover.

I yearned to make chai but wasn’t allowed. “What if you spill the boiling water and get burned,” my grandmother would fret. Finally, when I was in grade five, she reluctantly allowed me to make it under her supervision and soon I was making it alone.

I felt so accomplished, measuring water, grating ginger, and scooping sugar and tea leaves to add to the boiling water. Watching the tea leaves spinning with the ginger. Then adding the milk and watching it lighten the chai and simmer, steeping the flavours. “A good cup of chai needs a slow fire,” I was told, something I follow to this day.

Fast forward a few years, and I am on my way home on a bitterly cold January evening in Indore. The sun is on leave and the wind drills into my bones. I enter a silent, cold apartment – my mother isn’t back from the hospital yet and my grandmother has moved to live with my uncle since my grandfather passed away.

I need chai. Soon, I’m sitting with a hot, steaming cup, sipping it slowly. I close my eyes, savouring the sweet milk, sharp ginger and cinnamon. By then, I was experimenting with spices and adding what felt right at the moment – cinnamon, fennel, green cardamom and more. I would add lemongrass, holy basil and peppercorns if I had a cold or sore throat.

Chai is tea, tea is chai

Chai in India is a drink for no reason and for every reason, morning, afternoon, evening and night. It lifts your spirits while studying for the maths paper or learning chemistry formulas. It spices college gossip and fans rumours. A welcoming or parting drink, to convince friends and family to stay longer to share more stories.

It brings everyone together. It is served in homes, board meetings, college canteens, cafes and at weddings. “Chalo chai ho jaye,” (Let’s have tea) is heard every day.

Tea is chai in India. When, where, and how the first cup of chai was brewed is still up for debate, but the stories from our elders give us an idea about the evolution of this delicious, addictive beverage.

Prerna Kumar, founder of ChaiVeda and purveyor of medicinal blends, says: “The early reference to tea is found in the Buddhist texts where the monks drank some kind of tea while fasting and meditating.

“They made tea from foraged tea leaves and perhaps added certain flowers to the decoction to help them feel calmer.”…

By Nupur Roopa – Aljazeera

L’article Chai is tea, tea is chai: India’s favourite hot drink est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Momina Khatun is convinced she is cursed.

She’s one of hundreds of women in the north-eastern Indian state of Assam who married under the age of 18 – and are now stuck in limbo after their husbands were arrested in a crackdown on child marriage.

The state government claims it wants to eradicate the illegal practice, but Ms Khatun and other women whose husbands are in custody say they have been left helpless.

Ms Khatun, who is expecting a baby, didn’t have an easy start in life, but marriage turned out better than she expected.

Her father remarried when she was eight. A few months later her mother abandoned her too, leaving her to live with her paternal aunt in a tiny village in the state.

“Life was difficult there. I was treated like I was a burden to her family,” Ms Khatun said. Last year, when her aunt’s family decided to get her married at the age of 17, she was delirious with fear.

“We were always told that the man we marry will determine the quality of our life. I was young and worried what would happen if my husband was a bad person.”

But Yakub Ali, the farmer she married, turned out to be a kind man who took away the “loneliness and replaced it with genuine love and affection”, Ms Khatun said.

“There wasn’t much, we were poor. At least there was peace.”

But their happiness was short-lived.

On 4 February, Mr Ali was arrested from their home and charged with marrying Ms Khatun when she was a minor.

A week on, the 22-year-old remains in custody. Ms Khatun, who is seven months pregnant, has not been able to meet her husband since his arrest.

“Where do I go? I have no one. My child and I will die hungry and lonely,” she said.

Ms Khatun and hundreds of other women in Assam have been protesting after their male relatives were arrested in connection with cases of child marriage.

More than 8,100 people have been named in police complaints so far, including the parents of grooms and priests who performed the marriage ceremonies. It was not immediately clear how the police arrived at the figures – the BBC has contacted officials for comment – but at least 2,500 people have been arrested since last week.

Women like Ms Khatun see the action as a “cruel interference in their lives”.

Mostly uneducated and poor, they say the arrested men are primary breadwinners for their families and that they depend on them to survive. Videos of women, wailing outside police stations and rolling on the ground, have cascaded over social media, fuelling feelings of anger and outrage.

Those like Mr Ali, who are accused of marrying girls aged 14-18, are being charged under a law that bans child marriage and carries a sentence of two years and a fine.

Men accused of marrying girls below 14 have been charged under a more stringent law that protects children from sexual offences, a non-bailable felony carrying jail terms ranging from seven years to life.

Reports say that districts with higher Muslim populations in Assam have seen more arrests than others, though hundreds of Hindu men have also been arrested.

Under Muslim personal law in India, girls can get married once they reach puberty. The conflict between this and India’s Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, which bars all marriages of women below the age of 18, is being challenged in the Supreme Court.”There is a line of precedent that special laws will override general personal laws of any religion,” according to Dr Arghya Sengupta, research director of Vidhi Legal, a think-thank.

But he added that “the unjustness of the situation” also needs to be factored in. “The personal law of Muslims has allowed girls who have attained puberty to marry of their own free will for decades. So to suddenly throw their husbands in jail for a practice which, in their eyes, was never wrong may be unjust.”

Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma maintains that his government is at “war” against child marriage and isn’t targeting any one community. But critics say the retrospective arrests are the latest attempt of the state’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government to marginalise minorities, especially Bengali-speaking Muslims.

The community, which migrated from what was once East Pakistan and is now Bangladesh, has long faced discrimination in the multi-ethnic state, where linguistic identity and citizenship are the biggest political fault lines.

The Hindu-nationalist BJP government, which is also in power nationally, has announced a slew of policies, including a controversial citizenship law, that critics say discriminates particularly against Bengali-speaking Muslims.

Experts say the arrests could push illegal marriages underground, making them harder to report.

“Child marriages are more a social malaise than a religious one, and are rooted in poverty and patriarchy,” says Dr Abdul Azad, lecturer and researcher at Vrije University, Amsterdam.

“It is only through social and economic upliftment of communities that the practice can be truly eradicated – not by explicitly targeting a single community.”

Although illegal, child marriage is widespread in many parts of India mainly due to patriarchal customs, lack of education and poverty.

Very few cases are actually reported. In Assam, only 155 cases of child marriage were registered in 2021, and 138 in 2020, according to the National Crime Records Bureau.

The latest crackdown started on 23 January, when Mr Sarma expressed alarm over the soaring underage pregnancy rate in Assam and promised to put an end to the problem.

The sudden nature of the move has shattered many families.

Khalidul Rashid, a resident of Dhubri district in Assam, breaks down before he even begins speaking.

He says his 23-year-old daughter Kulsoom Khan took her own life on 4 February. The eldest of four, Kulsoom was married off when she was 14. In 2020, when her husband died of Covid-19, she moved back to her parent’s home with her two children.

Everything was fine in her life, her father says, but when she heard last week about the arrests, she became vey tense.

On Friday, she asked her father for her marriage certificate. “I told her that her husband was dead and she had nothing to worry about,” Mr Rashid says.

But Kulsoom was afraid the police would arrest her parents.

“So she took her life – to protect us,” Mr Rashid says.

Dr Kalam says that while most of the child marriages in Assam occur among the marginalised communities, a powerful social movement against the practice has taken shape in recent years.

Now the government’s “aggressive approach”, he says, will weaken this movement.

“Our society has become so divided that such brutal actions are gaining support,” Dr Kalam says.

Masud Zaman, a lawyer based in Dhubri district who is fighting on behalf of eight women protesters, agrees with the assessment.

A Muslim-dominated area, Dhubri has recorded the highest number of arrests.

“The common perception is that child marriage is a problem of Muslim society. But child marriage rates are high in Dhubri because it’s one of the poorest districts of Assam, where most families are illiterate. Not because Muslims live here,” Mr Zaman says.

He accused the government of turning a social issue into a communal one, at the expense of women’s lives.

While both Hindu and Muslim men have been rounded up in the recent arrests, the lawyer alleges there has been selective treatment in the way bail is being given.

“In Majuli – which is predominantly home to tribal communities – 24 men got bail within a day. We argued on behalf of [Muslim] men accused of the same offences on the same grounds, but couldn’t get bail.”

The BBC saw a copy of one of the bail orders passed by a district court in Majuli, which states the arrests had been made on “vague and insufficient grounds”.

Mr Zaman added that it was insensitive to think money – the government has announced financial compensation for the affected women – could alleviate their grief.

“What about the emotional bond between a wife and her husband? How will the government compensate women for that?”

It’s a question that haunts Ms Khatun.

“Does suffering ever end in a woman’s life?” she says.

World Opinions – BBC News

L’article Assam: India child brides desperate after mass arrests est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Like many African doctors, Peter Mativo had to travel overseas to complete his training.

In 2007 he left Kenya for Bangalore to pursue his goal of becoming a neurologist. After 18 months in India, he returned to Kenya and now works at the Aga Khan University Hospital in Nairobi.

“Most of us train in India, as Africa is not a developed continent. We have a very poor economy with no medical infrastructure in place nor specialised training,” he says.

“I would have never been able to get a specialised degree if I would have not opted for India,” Mr Mativo says.

India is keen to strengthen such ties with Africa. It has identified the healthcare sector as one area where trade between the continents can flourish.

So young African doctors are encouraged to finish their training in India, meanwhile Indian healthcare firms are expanding all over Africa.

“The African market is a natural fit for Indian pharmaceutical companies, as India is the largest provider of generic medicine in the world,” says Nisht Dubey.

Generic drugs made in India can sell at a quarter of the price of a branded equivalent, which makes them a popular choice in less well-off parts of the world.

“There is a big gap between demand and supply of medicines in Africa, with a huge disparity among rich and poor,” says Mr Dubey.

Spurred by a shortage of medicine and hospital equipment in Kenya during the Covid crisis, Mr Dubey set-up Goodstrain Pharma in 2020. It imports medicine and medical products from all over the world into Kenya.

Goodstrain’s warehouse and corporate offices are in Nairobi, but Mr Dubey wants it to expand across East Africa.

“Africa is the only pharmaceutical market where genuinely high growth is still achievable,” says Mr Dubey, who is originally from Uttar Pradesh in northern India.

But getting a firm going in Kenya has not been easy. Goodstrain’s very first shipment to Kenya was held up at customs for weeks – a major setback for the young firm.

Mr Dubey says they were not ready for the web of regulations covering imports. Now a third party, which specialises in clearing imports, handles that for them.

Africure Pharmaceuticals, has gone one step further than Goodstrain, by manufacturing pharmaceuticals in Africa.

The company, only founded in 2017, already has nine manufacturing facilities in Africa, employing 300 people across Cameroon, Namibia, Botswana and Côte d’Ivoire, with plans to build plants in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.

Africure’s factories make medications to treat pain, fever, inflammation, malaria, diabetes andhypertension, as well as a wide range of antibiotics.

“Africa over the years has been dependent on imports of medication from Europe, India, and China, which has resulted in the draining of precious foreign exchange, non-creation of job opportunities, and suffering the vagaries of supply and demand,” says Sinhue Noronha, founder and chief executive of Africure Pharmaceuticals.

Originally from Mumbai, Mr Noronha, hopes his firm will help tackle some of the problems in African healthcare.

“Our primary objective is to solve the persistent issues such as affordability, availability, low quality, technological dependence, and reliance on imports.

“All of our plants and distribution setups are engaged primarily to provide an uninterrupted supply of essential medicines.”

Mr Noronha says that Indian firms have a head start over rivals from elsewhere in the world.

“Indian manufacturers and importers are able to understand the African market because of our large diaspora presence in Africa.”

Even with those connections, Mr Noronha, has found building a business in Africa a bumpy experience.

“The biggest challenge is political instability. I may get a permission today to set up a manufacturing unit, and tomorrow the government or the health minister may resign. One has to be ready for any kind of eventuality,” he says.

He also says that personal safety is a consideration.

“Security is another big concern. murder and kidnapping are common in Africa. We Indians have to be very careful,” he says.

Broadly, Indian healthcare firms have a good reputation in Africa, but that hard won image has recently suffered significant damage.

https://emp.bbc.com/emp/SMPj/2.46.12/iframe.htmlMedia caption,

Three things to know about cough syrup and deaths in The Gambia

Police in The Gambia are investigating the deaths of 66 children, which have been linked to four brands of imported Indian cough syrup.

In October, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert over the cough syrups – warning they could be linked to acute kidney injuries and the children’s deaths in July, August and September.

“The Gambia incident is an aberration and we should feel bad about it,” says Udaya Bhaskar, director general of Pharmexcil, which promotes the export of Indian pharmaceuticals.

“This incident will certainly be a dent in our exports and the image of Indian pharma,” he says.

But he thinks the reputational damage will be short-lived.

“The important factor is that Africa is very dependent on other countries and India produces very good quality medicine, so the Gambia impact will be short-term.”

Back in Nairobi, Dr Mativo says the problem is the lack of testing facilities in Africa.

“The Gambia incident is sad. The biggest problem is we are not financially strong, nor do we have facilities which can check the standards of medicine supplied to us.”

He would like to see more products produced locally.

“In Africa most of the population cannot afford branded medicine… what we need is training and setting up manufacturing units in Africa.”

World Opinions – BBC News

L’article India seizes opportunities in African healthcare est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Un « scoop » sur des liens présumés entre un haut cadre du parti au pouvoir et Instagram a tourné au fiasco. Il se basait sur plusieurs faux documents transmis au site d’investigation.

Le média indépendant indien The Wire, spécialisé dans l’investigation et très critique à l’égard du gouvernement de Narendra Modi, a retiré en catastrophe, ce 18 octobre, une série d’articles portant sur les liens présumés entre Meta (Facebook, Instagram) et le parti du premier ministre, le BJP.

Il y a une semaine, The Wire avait publié un article affirmant que le chef de l’équipe numérique du BJP, Amit Malviya, disposait d’un passe-droit lui permettant de faire modérer automatiquement les messages lui déplaisant sur Instagram. A l’appui de cette affirmation, le site publiait un document, présenté comme un rapport interne à Meta, montrant qu’un signalement effectué par Amit Malviya avait automatiquement entraîné la suppression d’un message parce que M. Malviya fait partie d’un programme de Meta baptisé « Xcheck ».

Meta avait immédiatement contesté ces affirmations, expliquant notamment que le document sur lequel s’appuyait The Wire semblait être un faux. Le programme « Xcheck », bien documenté grâce aux révélations des « Facebook Files », concerne plusieurs millions de comptes dans le monde. Il rassemble des comptes de personnalités publiques, exemptés des outils de modération automatique de Facebook ou d’Instagram : leurs messages peuvent toujours être modérés, mais uniquement après intervention d’un modérateur humain. Rien ne montre en revanche que ce programme, souvent critiqué, permette à ces comptes de faire supprimer des messages.

Faux courriel du directeur de la communication de Meta

Face aux dénégations de Meta, The Wire a renchéri. Le 11 octobre, le site publiait un e-mail, présenté comme un message d’Andy Stone à ses équipes, dans lequel le responsable de la communication de Meta à l’échelle mondiale s’énervait de la « fuite » du document précédemment publié par The Wire – ce qui prouvait, selon le site d’information, l’authenticité du document.

Immédiatement après la publication de ce nouvel article, Meta affirmait que cet e-mail était, lui aussi, un faux. Si l’authenticité du courriel, selon les affirmations de The Wire, avait été confirmée par deux experts indépendants, plusieurs détails techniques, tout comme la manière dont l’e-mail était rédigé, semaient cependant le doute. Jusqu’à ce que les deux experts cités dans l’article annoncent, ce 18 octobre, n’avoir en réalité jamais été consultés pour authentifier le document – une ou plusieurs personnes se seraient faites passer pour eux afin de fournir de fausses preuves à The Wire.

Les « Facebook Files », une plongée dans les rouages de la machine à « likes »

Les « Facebook Files » sont plusieurs centaines de documents internes à Facebook copiés par Frances Haugen, une spécialiste des algorithmes, lorsqu’elle était salariée du réseau social. Ils ont été fournis au régulateur américain et au Congrès, puis transmis par une source parlementaire américaine à plusieurs médias, expurgés des informations personnelles des salariés de Facebook. En Europe, ces médias sont, outre Le Monde, le quotidien allemand Süddeutsche Zeitung, les chaînes de télévision WDR et NDR, le Groupe Tamedia, Knack, Berlingske et l’OCCRP.

Ils montrent que Facebook consacre davantage de ressources à limiter ses effets néfastes en Occident, au détriment du reste du monde. Ils attestent que ces effets sont connus en interne mais les signaux d’alerte pas toujours pris en compte. Enfin, ils prouvent que les algorithmes de Facebook sont devenus d’une complexité telle qu’ils semblent parfois échapper à leurs propres auteurs. Retrouvez tous nos articles en cliquant ici.

En parallèle, Meta a expliqué que le rapport de modération publié par The Wire avait été créé par une personne qui avait simplement utilisé un compte temporaire sur Facebook Workplace, un outil utilisé en interne chez Meta mais sur lequel n’importe qui peut créer son propre espace de travail. Ce Facebook Workplace a ensuite été rempli de faux messages émanant de l’équipe d’Instragam, selon Meta, qui l’a depuis bloqué. « La date de création de ce compte semble indiquer qu’il a été mis en place spécifiquement dans le but de créer de fausses preuves soutenant le reportage erroné de The Wire », écrit Meta dans un long communiqué contestant point par point les affirmations du média indien.

Face à cette avalanche de preuves, The Wire a finalement dépublié ses articles et annoncé une enquête interne. L’un des journalistes ayant travaillé sur ce dossier a affirmé que sa boîte e-mail avait été piratée durant le week-end.

En Inde, les relations entre Meta et le gouvernement Modi sont un sujet particulièrement sensible. Facebook et Instagram sont régulièrement accusés de favoriser indûment les partisans du BJP, très actifs en ligne et très bien organisés ; l’ancienne responsable des politiques publiques de Meta en Inde, Ankhi Das (qui a démissionné en 2020), était un soutien de Narendra Modi.

« [Le fait que The Wire ait tort] n’invalide pas les questions qui peuvent se poser sur les relations entre le BJP et Meta », écrivait, avant les derniers rebondissements de l’affaire, Alex Stamos, l’ancien chef de la sécurité de Facebook, parfois critique à l’encontre de son ancien employeur mais qui avait rapidement évoqué ses doutes sur les articles publiés par le site d’information. « Je dis depuis longtemps que la plus grande faiblesse structurelle de Meta est le lien entre ses politiques de gestion de ses plates-formes et ses relations avec les gouvernements. »

De nombreuses inconnues demeurent toutefois sur les motivations précises et l’origine des multiples manipulations ayant visé le site d’information et Meta.

World Opinions – Le Monde

L’article En Inde, une manipulation aurait visé le média indépendant « The Wire » est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.