Leading presidents and prime ministers from around the world are meeting for the annual G20 leaders’ summit in India’s capital, Delhi, from 9-10 September.

Narendra Modi is an authoritarian figure who, as India’s prime minister since 2014, has pushed his country into increasingly becoming a “de facto ethnic democracy”, in which Hindus define the national identity and non-Hindus are seen as second-class citizens. Yet as the host of the upcoming talks of the world’s 20 largest economies, Mr Modi will be feted by major global leaders – except his absent fellow strongmen Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Mr Modi’s dangerous majoritarianism is too easily overlooked by the west, as the G20 glad-handing will show. India had been considered an exemplary liberal parliamentary democracy among developing countries. This is being slowly dismantled by Mr Modi’s brand of Hindu nationalism. State intimidation has seen civil society harassed and critics jailed. A report by a group of prominent lawyers last year warned that “the administration of law has become the means by which … the Muslim community can be kept in a state of perpetual fear”. Since May, the north-eastern Indian state of Manipur has been burning, with its valley Hindus and highland Christians sinking into bloody fighting. Mr Modi’s party blames non-Hindus for the violence.

The Indian prime minister shares the ideological viewpoint of Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen in France and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Mr Modi claims India suffered 1,000 years of servitude: 750 years of Muslim rule, plus 250 years of British rule. Pulling down, or discarding, symbols of that history – mosques, mausoleums, Lutyens’ Delhi buildings – is excused, in this thinking, because this represents a national, Hindu resurgence. Mr Modi tellingly speaks of 1,000 years of rule to come.

The west thinks that it must keep stumm because it needs India to contain China. But at what cost to democracy and human rights? Mukul Kesavan, an Indian historian, wrote earlier this year that when the White House rolled out the red carpet for Mr Modi, “One of the more entertaining things about [his] visit has been the sight of [Joe] Biden welcoming a foreign leader who had openly campaigned for his predecessor and liberal bête noire, Donald Trump.”

Last year, Gothenburg University’s annual report on the state of global democracy warned of a wave of “autocratization” spreading around the world. Since 2020, the report said, India has not been a working democracy but an “electoral autocracy” similar to that in Russia. All is not lost. India’s next general election will provide a chance for the public to have its say – though how much remains to be seen, given that a peer-reviewed paper suggested that in 2019 Mr Modi won around 11 seats by suppressing the Muslim vote. Its author, a respected economist, quit after his university failed to back him. The arrival of the opposition Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance, otherwise known as INDIA, has also unsettled Mr Modi. Perhaps peeved at being opposed by “INDIA”, Mr Modi wants to respond only to the country’s Sanskrit name “Bharat”.

India’s prime minister says the G20 should let the global south shape the world’s future. As Human Rights Watch pointed out this week, “many proposed summit topics – debt crises, social protection programs, food security, climate change, internet freedom – are at their root about human rights”. Britain has its own share of democratic backsliding. But if Mr Modi desires successful outcomes then he, like all autocratic leaders, should understand why his actions at home undermine the arguments he wants to promote abroad.

Western democracies are wrong to overlook a country’s descent into electoral autocracy because they believe they need it to contain China

What is the G20?

The G20 – or Group of Twenty – is a club of countries which meets to discuss plans for the global economy.

Between them, G20 countries account for 85% of the world’s economic output and 75% of world trade. They contain two-thirds of the global population.

The members are the European Union and 19 nations – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US. Spain is always invited as a guest.

A smaller group of G20 member countries meets as the G7.

Some of the G20 member nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – have formed a separate group called Brics.

This is due to expand, having invited six other nations to join at its recent summit: Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

What does the group discuss?

The issues discussed by G20 leaders have broadened in recent years from just economics to include issues such as climate change, sustainable energy, international-debt forgiveness and taxing multinational corporations.

Every year, a different G20 member state takes over the presidency and sets the agenda for meetings.

Indonesia held the presidency in 2022, and the leaders’ summit was held in Bali.

As 2023 president, India wants the Delhi event to concentrate on sustainable development, as well as measures to spread economic growth more evenly between developed and developing countries.

The summit also provides an opportunity for one-to-one discussions to take place alongside group sessions.

The White House says that US President Joe Biden will talk to individual leaders about tackling climate change, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and getting global organisations such as the World Bank to do more to fight poverty.

However, the Kremlin says Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will not be attending the summit, and it’s been widely reported that China’s President Xi Jinping will also stay away.

Are there any controversial issues for G20 countries?

Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely to cause discord at the Delhi summit.

In March 2022, the G20 foreign ministers were unable to reach agreements at their meeting because of fierce arguments over the war between the US and Russia delegations.

At the Bali leaders’ summit in November 2022, discussions were dominated by a crisis involving missiles from the war falling on Poland’s side of the border with Ukraine.

In May, China and Saudi Arabia boycotted a G20 meeting on tourism which was held in Indian-administered Kashmir because the Kashmir region contains territory claimed by Pakistan as well as India.

A row has also broken out between India and China over a long-running border dispute, after Beijing released a map which claims the state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin plateau as Chinese territory.

What does the summit mean for India?

India has been positioning itself as a leading voice of developing countries known as the Global South in recent years and G20 is seen as its chance to deliver on these promises on a bigger stage.

The summit also comes ahead of the 2024 general elections in India and could bolster Mr Modi’s image as a leader who commands respect on the global stage.

The government has held hundreds of meeting across some 50 cities in the run-up to the summit in Delhi.

For months, cities and towns have been dotted with shiny billboards featuring the G20 logo and Mr Modi’s photos, framing the event as the prime minister’s earnest attempt to bring the world to India.

Mr Modi also appears to share a personal rapport with many of his G20 counterparts, including President Biden who accorded him a coveted state visit in June.

That said, the summit is not expected to be a breeze for India, given the current complex geopolitical situation.

Many economies are still struggling to recover from the pandemic and have grown increasingly anxious about the war and its economic impact, with global surges in food and energy prices.

Why is there a ‘family photo’?

At the end of key summits, the heads of government often pose for a group photograph, known as the “family photo”.

However, the diplomatic discord revealed by the image sometimes makes headlines in its own right.

In 2018, following the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was largely ignored, and made to stand at the far end of the group.

What has the G20 achieved?

At the 2008 and 2009 leaders’ summits, during the financial crisis, leaders agreed a host of measures to rescue the global economic system.

But some critics argue that subsequent summits have been less successful, often as a result of tensions between rival world powers.

However, bilateral meetings at the summit have often proved constructive.

In 2019, at Osaka, then-US president Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to resume talks to settle a major trade dispute.

Do G20 summits attract protests?

Big demonstrations often take place around the leaders’ summits.

Anti-capitalist protesters demonstrated at the 2010 summit in Toronto and the 2017 summit in Hamburg.

Thousands of demonstrators marched during the 2018 summit in Rio de Janeiro to protest against the G20’s economic policies.

In 2009 Ian Tomlinson, a newspaper seller, died after he was caught up in protests during the G20 summit in London.

World Opinions +The Guarasidian + BBC NEWS + Agencies

L’article View on India’s G20 summit: a backsliding democracy gets to play host est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Chinese interference fears have gripped Ottawa. But appearing before House committees recently, I realised Canada should be scared most of its own MPs.

Canada has lost its mind.

To be precise, much of official Ottawa has abandoned the remnants of its already questionable faculties. A faux scandal, manufactured by the nexus of scoop-thirsty reporters and hyperbole-addicted politicians – is there any other kind? – has gripped the capital like a drug-resistant psychosis.

These fulminating reporters and politicians have been reduced – figuratively speaking – to parading around newsrooms and parliament in a critical-thinking-sapping state, carrying signs that read: The end of democracy is nigh.

Bit by devious bit, Chinese agents and their proxies have eaten covertly away, they say, at the vulnerable foundations that gird Canada’s democratic institutions.

All that stands between apocalypse and possible salvation are the patriots working inside Canada’s always law-abiding spy services who apparently belt out “O Canada” at breakfast and at bedtime with hands on maple-leaf-forever-tattooed hearts.

That, discerning international readers, is only a slightly exaggerated portrait of the hysteria that has paralysed a once-sedate city for months. I wouldn’t be surprised if more than a few of its jittery occupants who hold public office have checked under their desks to see if a Beijing-compromised, fifth columnist is lurking there.

I live in Toronto. So, happily, I have been able to avoid succumbing to the “yellow peril”-induced madness. Still, I had more than a disconcerting taste of it over the past few weeks while appearing three times as a witness before two House of Commons committees probing Chinese influence campaigns.

Given my long history of reporting on Canada’s cavalier security services and Chinese influence efforts, I reluctantly agreed to attend via Zoom in the faint hope that my testimony might act as a brake on the prevailing panic and the rampant, McCarthyite guilt-by-association accusations poisoning Ottawa.

How wrong I was.

I came away convinced that China poses less of a threat to Canada’s democratic institutions than the sad, pedestrian members of parliament – with one exception – I encountered, who purport to defend those ever-so-fragile institutions now allegedly under siege.

My overarching message did not register. While I agree that Chinese interference is troublesome, a witch-hunt-like fever has infected lawmakers and reporters intent on “unmasking” so-called “seditious” Canadians reminiscent of the shameful purge of public servants only a few generations ago as a result of their left-wing politics and homosexuality.

It is dangerous and corrosive. People’s lives, livelihoods and reputations are being damaged by inept spies and their grateful conduits in the media and on Parliament Hill.

Indeed, I watched, sometimes with bewilderment, often in disgust, as a string of parliamentarians debased themselves and the country they supposedly represent, in search of a “gotcha” moment that might attract a reporter’s ephemeral attention or the approval of their party leaders who are more interested in stoking fear and conjecture rather than encouraging sobriety and the truth.

In this deplorable regard, members of the opposition Conservative Party, the separatist Bloc Quebecois (BQ) and the pretend socialist party of Canada, the New Democrats (NDP), distinguished themselves.

Without fail, Tory MPs channeled every disagreeable aspect of Pierre Poilievre, their stunt-prone, smug demagogue of a leader who believes that anger and ignorance are essential prerequisites to becoming prime minister.

Each of these rabid partisans tried to out-smear the other to curry favour with a jejune politician who makes the Borg-like former Conservative Party leader, Stephen Harper, seem almost genteel in comparison.

The nadir of this ugliness occurred when a Conservative MP asked a witness and publisher of Sinophobic tracts whether former Governor General of Canada David Johnston was an “elite capture” of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “based on his ties to China”.

Predictably, the conspiracy-consumed pair forgot that Johnston was appointed Canada’s titular head of state in 2010 by none other than Harper.

Oh, never mind.

In any event, the witness said that of course Johnston was an “elite capture” since “over his 40-year career [Johnston] has had a positive predisposition to China and the PRC.”

It was a disgraceful question and reply and I said so. Incidentally, the sorry exchange went some way towards suggesting that the Conservative Party’s email address these days should be: conservatives@inthegutter.ca.

Johnston is in the Conservatives’ ferocious crosshairs because he was appointed by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a “special rapporteur” to examine a slew of selective leaks concerning Chinese interference in Canadian politics and two recent elections.

In an interim report, Johnston found that China’s influence campaigns had no impact on those elections, that media reports surrounding the scope and nature of that interference were overblown or “false,” and that, as a sinister by-product, loyal Canadians were being tarred as disloyal.

None of it mattered, such was the disfiguring intensity of the animus in the hearings towards an honourable man who has served Canada in a variety of important capacities.

Meanwhile, the separatist BQ was too busy bowing before the “expertise” of a couple of spooks-turned-boy-scouts to remember that not too long ago the very same security services set ablaze a barn where separatists planned to meet. Or that the security services were responsible for at least 400 illegal break-ins in Quebec (including the offices of a separatist press agency), and that they stole the membership list of the separatist Parti Quebecois.

The BQ’s amnesia is as halting as its naivete.

A starry-eyed member of Canada’s pretend socialist NDP allowed the two spies to claim – without a word of pushback – that the secrecy-drenched and accountability-allergic agencies they work for are committed to openness, transparency and the rule of law.

I had to stifle the urge to laugh.

The criminally ill-prepared NDP MP was not aware, it appears, that a succession of federal court judges has, in the recent past, slammed the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for withholding information from the court, lying and routinely breaking the law.

If the derelict legislator had done an ounce of research, she would have discovered that in July 2020 Justice Patrick Gleeson excoriated CSIS for having an “institutional disregard for — or, at the very least, a cavalier institutional approach to — the duty of candour and regrettably the rule of law”.

Examples of CSIS’s subterfuge abound. In an effort to deport a Canadian it suspected of being a “terrorist” in 2009, the spy service not only lied to, but kept exculpatory information from, a judge deciding the man’s fate. In 2016, another incensed federal court judge blasted CSIS for failing to disclose that it had, for more than a decade, illegally gathered and stored metadata unrelated to national security investigations involving scores of unsuspecting Canadians.

The solicitous NDP MP did not recall any of it. Like her flippant, sound-bite-happy leader, Jagmeet Singh, she capitulated to the hysteria, rather than make an informed effort to cauterise it.

Only Matthew Green, an Ontario NDP MP, struck me as having the gravitas to approach this delicate file with the calmness and intelligence it requires.

I should have listened to my instincts and stayed far away from Ottawa and the largely vapid politicians who populate it.

In the remote chance that I receive another emailed invitation to appear before a committee after this column is published, I will press delete.

By Andrew Mitrovica – Al Jazeera columnist

L’article Canadian democracy is on edge — and China isn’t to blame est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

Fierce fighting erupts in the capital, Khartoum, and elsewhere in Sudan, dealing a new blow to hopes for the country’s transition to democracy.

Sudan’s military and a powerful paramilitary force have engaged in fierce fighting in the capital and elsewhere in country, dealing a new blow to hopes for a transition to democracy and raising fears of a wider conflict.

At least 25 people were killed and 183 others were injured in clashes across the country on Saturday, the Sudanese Doctors’ Union told the Reuters news agency. The group was unable to determine if all the casualities were civilians.

The clashes capped months of heightened tensions between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group. Those tensions had delayed a deal with political parties to get the country back to its short-lived transition to democracy, which was derailed by an October 2021 military coup.

After a day of heavy fighting, the military ruled out negotiations with the RSF, instead calling for the dismantling of what it called a “rebellious militia”.

The sound of heavy firing could be heard throughout Saturday across the capital, Khartoum, and nearby city Omdurman, where the military and the RSF have amassed tens of thousands of troops since the coup.

Witnesses said fighters from both sides fired from armoured vehicles and from machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks in fighting in densely populated areas. Some tanks were seen in Khartoum. The military said it launched attacks from planes and drones at RSF positions in and around the capital.

Residents described chaotic scenes. “Fire and explosions are everywhere,” said Amal Mohamed, a doctor in a public hospital in Omdurman. “All are running and seeking shelter.”

“We haven’t seen such battles in Khartoum before,” said Khartoum resident Abdel-Hamid Mustafa.

Clashes intensify for control of airports

One of the flashpoints was Khartoum International Airport. There was no formal announcement that the airport was closed, but major airlines suspended their flights.

This included Sudan-bound flights from Egypt and Saudi Arabia which turned back after nearly landing at the airport, flight tracking data showed..

World Opinions – Agencies

L’article Army and rival forces clash as power struggle rocks Sudan.. Video est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

In early December 2022, after months of violence and uncertainty, the UN mission in Sudan announced the signing of a “framework agreement” between the country’s military and political parties.

The deal is aimed at ending a standoff between the two sides triggered by a coup in October 2021. A product of international mediation led by the US, the framework agreement supposedly provides for a two-year, “civilian-led” transition towards elections.

It is true that after the 2021 coup, which triggered a new episode of violent repression that already claimed the lives of some 120 protesters, Sudan desperately needs to find its way back to the path towards democracy.

Last month’s deal, however, will serve no purpose other than providing another lifeline to the actors responsible for the current political deadlock. The deal does not touch crucial issues like transitional justice, accountability and security sector reform, and thus, just like many others before it, fails to offer a blueprint for breaking the vicious cycle of democratic regression, violence and military intervention.

Since the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Sudan’s international partners came up with countless deals, arrangements and frameworks that they claimed would end instability and bring the country closer to democratic governance. However, these efforts always centred on those already wielding power and ignored the aspirations of those truly responsible for the toppling of the al-Bashir regime: pro-democracy activists, and especially women and youths, who led the protests and spearheaded the movement for freedom in 2019.

Last month’s ‘framework agreement’ is unlikely to deliver democratic governance and stability.

It is time we understand that agreements between the military and political elites, however positive they may appear on the surface, will not help Sudan achieve peace and stability. What Sudan needs is a new political arrangement that centres and invests in the pro-democracy movement and works to help it build democratic leadership capacity.

I have firsthand experience with the many obstacles that prevent the pro-democracy movement from transforming into an effective vehicle for democratic governance.

I have been involved in political activism in Sudan since I was 16. In a closed, conservative society under an oppressive regime, engaging in political and public work as a young woman was not easy. I had two options: I could either involve myself in women’s organisations and platforms, which at the time were acting as subordinate to the male-dominated political organisations, or I could attempt to navigate my way into mainstream political parties and confront the many layers of power relations and anti-woman attitudes there.

I went with the latter option. Navigating Sudan’s political party culture characterised by repression, alienation, bullying and sexual harassment as a woman was difficult. On top of all this, I also had to deal with the stigmatisation of politically active women in society. Although it was a frustrating experience in many regards, it taught me a lot about how political organisations function in an impoverished, polarised country and what challenges they need to overcome to break the cycle of militarised governance.

When I eventually moved from party politics to civil society work, I found myself in a struggle of a different nature. In civil society spaces, connecting with the masses and agitating for change was perhaps easier, but we held even less official power. Despite the challenges, however, as an activist working for various civil society platforms, I was able to support other activists and collaborate with pro-democracy organisations and human rights defenders during critical times to help bring an end to al-Bashir’s oppression.

During the 2018-2019 protests in Sudan, an overwhelming majority of protesters on the streets were young, and more than 60 percent of them were women. Thus, women and young people rightfully believed they owned the uprising and viewed the revolution as a fruit of their labour. Despite in many ways leading the process of bringing down the Bashir regime, however, the women and youth of Sudan eventually had to yield to the leadership of weak and isolated political parties for several reasons.

Between the time I was part of Sudan’s political scene in the late 1980s and early 1990s to 2019, some 30 years have passed and so much has changed. By the time the revolution was under way and al-Bashir was on his way out, political parties had long lost any connection they had with the people and were solely interested in self-preservation. They had failed to engage with and accommodate in their policy plans the new waves of activism led by women, youths and minorities. Thus, in their attempts to lead the political transition after the revolution, they were doomed to failure.

The blame for this sad state of affairs is not on political parties alone. For decades, the international community neglected and undermined Sudan’s civilian political parties and movements while accepting the “strong men” with guns as their primary interlocutors.

Due to this lack of support and guidance, Sudan’s vibrant civil society successfully instigated regime change but failed to generate effective political leadership in the aftermath of the revolution.

And deals like the one signed last month, which serve to legitimise the military’s overinflated role in Sudan’s governance while giving the impression of democratic progress, further prevent the pro-democracy movement from developing political leadership capabilities. They provide the military and out-of-touch armed movements with legitimacy and make the dream of a truly civilian democracy even harder to achieve for activists.

Some suggest – given Sudan’s more than half a century of history of military control, economic fragility and the tendency for political violence combined with the current lack of a viable democratic leadership contender – the Sudanese should settle for military rule or a hybrid military-civilian government in the name of stability and security. Last month’s framework agreement also appears to be an effort in this direction.

However, the Sudanese people cannot and should not accept anything less than true democracy.

After holding on to the government for decades amid extreme polarisation, systemic corruption and civil wars, the Sudanese military and its allies from armed movements are in decay and in no state to rule over a country. Insisting on giving a role – any role – to the military in Sudan’s governance would prevent the country from moving on from its painful past and building robust democratic institutions and systems. Keeping military rule alive in any shape or form would only bring more suffering and instability to the country.

Sudan deserves an opportunity for democracy. We deserve a chance to move beyond military rule. What we need is not a “framework deal”, recycling broken promises, or even money. We need the international community to truly support our civil society so we can take the steps to finally return the military to its barracks for good and build truly democratic leadership for our country.

By Hala Al-Karib  is an activist and research practitioner from Sudan – Aljazeera

L’article Debate. Sudan should not settle for anything other than true democracy est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

In 2017, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise (Unsubmissive France) sat alongside Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s Syriza, the Bernie Sanders campaign in the US and Labour under Jeremy Corbyn as part of a worldwide “left populist wave” that combined charismatic leadership with radical policies. He channelled French citizens’ anger at austerity policies – blamed on Brussels bureaucrats – and proposed an exit from the EU (in case treaty change was not achieved) and Nato. Mélenchon held rallies looking like an enraged tribune of the people in a Mao suit, and took swipes at the French elite: “the caste and its puppets” and the “ignoble” politicians of the socialist party. While his presidential bid scored an impressive 19%, only 11% voted for the party in the parliamentary elections.

The situation is very different now. A more amiable Mélenchon leads the Nupes (Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale) coalition that polled a hair ahead of Macron’s Ensemble coalition in the first round of the French parliamentary elections this week – 26.1% to 25.8%. This is a stunning result for the left after decades on the margins. While it remains unlikely that Mélenchon will win enough MPs in the second round to claim the role of prime minister in an uneasy co-habitation with president Macron, a powerful case has been made for the attractiveness of a left alternative to Macron’s neoliberal centrism.

Key to this is Mélenchon’s own evolution from the populist insurgent accused of dividing the left and adopting a nationalist stance, to the politician who has managed to reunite the left for the first time in 20 years and convince the public it is fit for government. Other leftist projects that emerged in the turmoil of the 2010s may want to draw lessons from it.

Mélenchon’s 2022 strategy shifted from geopolitical issues in favour of bread-and-butter policies: raising the minimum wage to €1,500 a month after taxes, reducing pensionable age to 60 (Macron wants to raise it from 62 to 65), and the introduction of price controls to protect people from the cost of living crisis – pragmatic demands compared to the previous electoral cycle. As the University College London professor Philippe Marlière has noted, the Nupes programme is “radical reformist”, and contrary to the 1972 left unity programme, it does not specifically call for a “transitional break with capitalism”.

Alongside this, the 70-year-old Mélenchon has softened his revolutionary image. He has adopted a presidential tone, presenting himself as an able statesman who is aware of the need to find compromises with other parties and even certain sections of capital. The radical policies on the EU and Nato of 2017 that were particularly beloved by some left militants – but attracted wide criticism – has been bracketed as part of a common alliance programme. Furthermore, Mélenchon has emphasised his statesman credentials as a long-term politician and former minister and his readiness to govern.

From the leader of France’s Nupes coalition to Bernie Sanders, radical left firebands are shifting their focus and style

Mélenchon’s trajectory exemplifies a more general trend in the European and international left: many former left populists have now de facto become radical reformists: toning down their more identitarian rhetoric and anti-establishment antagonism to focus on the concrete policy solutions they have on offer. In Spain, the left has moved from the charismatic, sometimes rambunctious leadership of Pablo Iglesias to the more reassuring figure of Yolanda Díaz. Díaz is a labour lawyer from a family of trade unionists but is widely respected for her administrative competence and for delivering an effective furlough programme during the pandemic and on her promise to pass reform on temporary contracts. Significantly, her keyword is “diálogo” (dialogue): she insists that while defending the interests of workers, she wants to find a compromise with entrepreneurs in the general interest of the country.

During the 2010s, Sanders launched strong attacks against the establishment of the Democratic party in the US. But he has since tried to forge an uneasy alliance with Joe Biden against the obstructionism of centrist Dems such as Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema, who have stalled the US president’s flagship Build Back Better social package. He now heads the powerful budget committee in the Senate and has tried to redirect economic policy discussion in Congress in a more progressive direction.

In the UK there has not been such maturation of the left populism of the 2010s into radical social democracy. Rather, the Labour leader, Keir Starmer, has almost completely abandoned Jeremy Corbyn’s policies without even doing much to try to co-opt some of his more promising young leaders and thinkers, as Biden has tried to do on the other side of the Atlantic.

Former leaders of the 2010s left-populist movement softening their stances doesn’t mean their original movement was wrongheaded. It was a necessary moment of recomposition and reconstruction of a new left identity for the 21st century. But the focus is now shifting away from identity-building to the more painstaking task of coalition-building and policy delivery rather than charismatic appeals. Many involved are aware that they were perhaps wrong to frame as “radical” and “uncompromising” policies that were often quite commonsense social democratic offers – had they been given a softer branding, these may perhaps have proven appealing also to people who do not necessarily define themselves as “anti-capitalists”.

Various opinion polls show that in Europe and the US, there is a wide section of the electorate looking for politicians and parties offering redistributive socio-economic policies to fight against ballooning inequality. These are policies that were once offered by traditional centre-left parties and figures that have since mostly abandoned any pretence of being social democratic and enthusiastically embraced liberal pro-market policy – as is most evident precisely in the case of Macron. The new left that emerged over the course of the 2010s can now step into that void. Socialism may have to wait, but social democracy is there to be claimed.

By Paolo Gerbaudo is a sociologist at Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, Italy, and King’s College London and the author of The Great Recoil – theguardian.com

L’article Mélenchon’s lesson to the left: less socialism, more social democracy est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.

In separate letters, legislators and advocacy groups ask the administration of US President Joe Biden to do more to protect Tunisian democracy.

Lawmakers and rights groups in the United States are calling on the Biden administration to pressure Tunisian President Kais Saied to stop what they describe as the North African country’s “democratic backsliding”.

In a letter addressed to the top members of the US House of Representatives panel that allocates funds to the Department of State, US legislators have urged Washington to condition parts of the US’s security assistance package to Tunis.

The letter, a draft of which was shared with Al Jazeera, had garnered 12 signatures from House members by Tuesday morning, including Tom Malinowski, who helped lead the effort, Joe Wilson, Adam Schiff, Ro Khanna, Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar.

“President Kais Saied’s power grab since July 25, 2021 threatens to derail this democratic transition and could usher in another dictatorship in the region or a period of increased unrest and instability,” the letter reads.

“The US position has remained relatively muted as Saied has consolidated control over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and cracked down on dissent.”

This is the latest push by US legislators to get the administration of President Joe Biden to do more to protect democracy in Tunisia. It comes as the State Department takes its 2023 budget request to Congress, which holds the authority to allocate funds for the executive branch.

The document calls for that State Department funding bill to include language requiring the Biden administration to withhold portions of US security assistance to Tunisia “until and unless” Saied’s government meets human rights standards.

That includes ending the prosecution of journalists and politicians in military courts, removing military personnel blocking the Tunisian parliament building, and ceasing the “repression of fundamental rights of civilians and political and media figures”.

Elected in 2019, Saied froze the Tunisian parliament last year and subsequently dissolved it in March to rule by decree.

While critics decried the moves as a “coup” that risked bringing the country back to the authoritarianism of the pre-2011 uprisings that toppled longtime Tunisian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Saied and his supporters say his actions are necessary “reforms” aimed at fighting corruption.

Last week, Saied also seized control of Tunisia’s electoral commission and restructured it in a decree that raised fresh concerns about the integrity of future elections, including a July referendum on a new constitution.

On Tuesday, the US State Department said it was “deeply concerned” about the decision.

“A genuinely independent election authority is critical, given its constitutionally mandated role in Tunisia’s upcoming referendum and parliamentary elections,” spokesperson Ned Price told reporters.

“The United States has consistently communicated to Tunisian leaders the importance of upholding the independence of key democratic institutions and ensuring Tunisia returns to democratic governance.”

The Tunisian embassy in Washington, DC did not immediately respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment on Wednesday afternoon.

On Tuesday, 50 US rights groups and Muslim-American organisations sent a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken calling on the Biden administration to use its leverage to pressure Saied to “restore democratic order” in Tunisia.

“Tunisians have made hard-won gains over the subsequent decade to establish a long-sought democracy, even as other post-Arab Spring states backslid into dictatorial rule or descended into civil war,” said the letter, which was signed by Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and American Muslims for Palestine, among others.

“But now Tunisia’s delicate democratic experiment is being rapidly reversed after a blatant power grab by its autocratic president Kais Saied.”

The groups said the Biden administration should “match its rhetoric” with action by conditioning aid to the North African country. “We call on the Biden administration to suspend US military assistance until Tunisia is on a path towards democracy,” they said.

The letter also urged Washington to halt $500m in development grants that “requires Tunisia to meet democratic thresholds, until this same condition is met”.

Tunisia has long been seen as the sole success story of the Arab Spring – the 2011 uprisings against autocratic rule that swept across several countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

US aid to Tunisia, including security assistance, rose significantly after the country’s 2011 uprising and the US designated Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally in 2015, cementing the partnerships between the two countries.

But Biden’s proposed budget for 2023, which was released in late March, calls for slashing security assistance for Tunisia to around $61m, down from $121m last year, the Al-Monitor news website first reported earlier this month.

The Biden administration has repeatedly expressed “concern” about Saied’s conduct.

“We have consistently communicated to Tunisian officials that any political reform process should be transparent and inclusive, and undertaken in coordination with a range of political parties, labour unions, and civil society,” the State Department’s Price said after the Tunisian parliament was dissolved last month.

“A swift return to constitutional governance including an elected parliament is critical to democratic governance, and will ensure widespread and lasting support for needed reforms to help Tunisia’s economy rebound.”

WORLD OPINIONS BY AL JAZEERA

L’article Analysis. Lawmakers, rights groups urge US to condition aid to Tunisia est apparu en premier sur زوايا ميادين | Mayadin Columns.